Legal transplants have been the most common method used to create and modify business laws in Colombia. Most legal transplants are based on the assumption that transplanting laws from foreign legal institutions are per se better in achieving economic growth and spurring eventually economic development. However this is not necessarily true. Governments in developing countries must not take laws from developed countries solely because they are already in existence; each country must look at its society and determine if there is a need for additional laws.
I. InTRoDuCTIon
New Institutional Economics believe that law is the most adaptable institution that can be used to create incentives that contribute to achieve economic growth and development in society. (Rodrik & Subramanian, 2003 ) Douglass C. North, recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economics, defined institutions as "the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, [institutions] are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence they structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social or economic." (North, 1990) Institutions are classified by North as formal and informal, formal institutions are created intentionally by humans and have their highest expression in the constitution of a nation and its various laws or acts; informal institutions, are internal incentives that can be grouped as codes of conduct; social, moral or cultural rules, among others. All of these affect the way that people live in society. (North, 1990) Institutions affect the behavior between people by providing a stable (but not necessarily efficient) structure were human transactions occurs. According to Douglass C. North, the existence of a stable structure was human interact and the ability of the people to enter into transactional relationships amongst themselves. This constituted the major role of institutions in a society because it reduces "uncertainty" in human life.
2 (North, 1990) In theory, formal institu-2 It is important to acknowledge that Institutions are not the only ones that influence the activities between persons, there are people who gather in pursuit of some specific objectives or purposes, these groups are called by Douglass C. North as organizations, and these ones in tions are provided by political entities in charge of creating rules and standards of the game in society and markets, something called generally as legal system. 3 In Colombia the creation of law is done and structured through a process that takes place in Congress, generally with the active participation of the Executive, and on other occasions with the collaboration of other political organizations as well. function differently. In other words, it sometimes seems that law is going one-way and society, including business dealings, is going the other way. Some authors have previously elaborated on this idea; Hernando de Soto described it as the difference between law in western and nonwestern countries, when he said: "[i]n the west, the law is less concerned with representing the physical reality of buildings or real estate [rather it is more concerned] with providing a process or rules that will allow society to extract potential surplus value from those assets." (De Soto, 2000) De Soto also explained the challenge of nonwestern countries in creating bridges between a legal and extralegal world:
"The challenge today in most non-western countries is not to put all the nation's land and buildings on the same map (which has probably already been done) but to integrate the formal legal conventions inside the bell jar with the extralegal ones outside of it…It is law that detaches and fixes the economic potential of assets as a value separate from the material assets themselves and allows humans to discover and realize that potential. It is the law that connects assets into financial and investment circuits.
And it is the representation of assets fixed in legal property documents that gives them the power to create surplus value." (De Soto, 2000) The disparity problem is related with the evolution of legal institutions in developing countries.
Typically as it relates to laws from developing country, the base part of a law is primarily borrowed from other already established and developed countries. This concept of borrowing laws from other countries in order for a country to create its own laws is known as legal transplants. Borrowing laws from another place or time have become the solution to law development, to the point that in some cases it is a common characteristic in the creation of laws.
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In Colombia, Congress and other political organizations in charge of law production have failed by omission in developing --inventing and innovating --law as a reflexive process that should integrate formal legal institutions with informal institutions of society and markets using as
The term "Legal Transplant" has been used by legal scholars since Alan Watson in 1974 used it in his book "Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law". The main argument of Watson is that law is primary borrowed of other societies in space and time, specifically the term indicates the process of moving a legal rule from one society to another; this process can take the shape of a particular legal rule or a system of rules in part or as a whole. 1993) point of reference extralegal institutions of society and markets.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section II describes the evolution of legal institutions and legal transplants in Colombia. First, it analyzes how in some cases legal transplants might imply legal restrictions when transplant of legal institutions are not contextualized to social and economic conditions. Section II also describes the evolution of Business law through legal transplants in four periods since 1853 until today and finally it traces the evolution of the ultra vires theory in Colombia business law, making some concluding observations that set the scope of the analysis. Section III analyzes the relation between the evolution of business law through legal transplants in Colombia and a path dependence process of legal production.
Section IV analyzes the relation between legal institutions and its relationship with economic growth and development. Section V will examine the relationship between the asymmetries of information and government failures. Finally, Section VI will conclude.
II. EVoLuTIon of LEgAL InsTITuTIons AnD LEgAL TRAnsPLAnTs In CoLomBIA
The process of transplanting law in Colombia started at the moment Colombia achieved its independence. The Constitution of 1821, also known as Cucuta Constitution, ironically borrowed all the Spaniard legislation that ruled during colonial times. However the Colombian Constitution limited its transplants only to legislation that would not oppose the constitution or any new laws enacted by congress. 6 It was only a matter of time for the ruling creoles to introduce new laws. For some Latin American countries legal change was borrowed from the country that initially established the colony and the country's created legal institutions (known as donor or mother country). In other cases, the new laws were literally borrowed from another country that previously made the adaptation to local context making this new adaptation a transplant of a transplant.
A. Andres Bello: Legal Transplants and Legal Restrictions
Andres years as well that his ability in the use of sources, language and adaptation to Chile's circumstances. (Mirow, 2001 ) The Chilean Civil Code drafted 6 Article 188 of Constitution of 1821 says "They are declared in force and effect laws that until this time governed in all subjects and points, which directly or indirectly do not oppose to this Constitution, nor the decrees and laws to issue the Congress." Examples of this first rules borrowed were: 1."The Seven Part Code", 2."Newest Compilation", 3."Statutes of Bilbao" and 4."Recompilation of the Laws of Indies". See for an extended discussion, Obregon Esquivel T. and Edwin M. Borchard, Latin American Commercial Law (Obregon; 1921) .
by Andres Bello has been used as reference by other Latin American countries.
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The origin of the Colombian Legal Civil System was created when it used Chilean Civil Code as its principal source. Because of this, it is fair to say that the origin of the Civil Legal System of Colombia is a legal transplant of a legal transplant. some areas of that were without owners. Factor endowments, like abundant land, may contribute in achieving economic performance by using them in productive uses and converting them in capital. 9 Although, without labor it is useless, indeed, it is necessary a mechanism that creates incentives that encourage improvement of those resources; one possibility in achieving this purpose would be through the establishment of property rights.
A mechanism that established property rights was structured through the Law 137 de 1959
(also known as Tocaima law); the purpose was to resolve a social economic problem that emerged when lands that technically belonged to the State were possessed, used and improved by people without a property title. Tocaima
Law established that lands would be given to
Municipalities of Colombia with a precise instruction to transfer them through contracts of sale to all persons that have possessed and improved lands belonging to the state at the time of the law.
Establishing property rights is only one of the mechanisms that could have been used by drafters of Colombian Civil Code, but this was not the case. The use of land without owner was not resolved by an internal solution, it was resolved by an external solution without even considering local conditions. This land was considered out 9 Apparently the case of some Spanish colonies was quite different. Stanley L. Engerman and Kenneth L. Sokoloff argue that in Central America, South America and the Carribean, factor endowments, like abundant land and disposable hand labor (natives), "led to highly unequal distributions of wealth, income, human capital, and political power early in their histories, along with institutions that protected the elites. Together, these conditions inhibited the spread of commercial activity among the general population." See for an extended discussion, (Frieden, 2000) of commerce, because of that, it could not be used as collateral for mortgage loans, inherited, transfer or even rented for a long period of time.
In conclusion, legal constraints in land helped immobilize or divert resources towards less productive activities (Coatsworth, 1978) .
B. Legal Transplants and the Evolution of Business Law in Colombia
Just like civil law, business law has also been developed through legal transplants. Business law in Colombia has evolved in four different periods.
The first period of business regulation was distinguished by the work of Justo Arosemena.
Arosemena was an eager and persistent senator that initially proposed commercial regulation in 1842 and proposed it again to Congress in 1853. The code that eventually passed was almost a pure legal transplant of the Spanish Commercial Code of 1829.
The second period of business regulation was divided into two phases. 3. "Creating a determined fund of stocks to apply it on one or many objects, that give name to the social firm, whose management will be entrusted to managers or agents removable at the will of the partners, and this company is the one that receives the name as anonymous."
Art. 265 "The mercantile company can be contracted:" 1. "In collective name, under common agreements to all partners involved and in the proportion that they have agreed, of the same rights and obligations, and this one is known by the name as regular collective company."
2. "Providing one or more persons the funds, to be in the results of social operations under the exclusive direction of other partners that manage them on their own name: this one is entitle comandita in company."
3. "Creating a determined fund of stocks to apply it on one or many objects, that give name to the social firm, whose management will be entrusted to managers or agents removable at the will of the partners, and this company is the one that receives the name as anonymous."
Other examples of the Spanish Law of 1829 that were borrowed by Colombia are Article 284 which stated that all the company contracts should be done through a public instrument--also known as notary instrument provided with all legal formalities and Article 286 that determined that the public document were firms or company were created must express necessarily:
1. The names, surnames and residence of the subscribers.
2. The firm name or signature of the company.
3. The partners that will be in charge of the administration of the company and the use of the firm name.
4. The capital introduced by each of the partners in ready money, credits or effects, with the expression of the value of them, or the way in which the valuation has to be made.
5. The share of the profits or losses assigned to each capitalist partner, or to industrial partners in case of them.
6. The duration of the company, when it has to be for a fixed time, or for a determined object.
7. The branch of commerce, factory or navigation on which the business of the company is to be concerned, in the case that this one is established for one limited or many type of businesses.
8. The sums designated annually to each partner for his private expenses, and the compensation that in case of excess should receive the others.
9. The submission to trial of arbitrators in case of difference between partners, expressing the way in which the appointment would be made.
10. The way in which the liquidation and division of the partnership property is to be effected.
11. All other matters in which partners would like to establish special agreements. The central government had to decide which law adopt, so it started a selection process, selecting laws from different states within the Union.
The 21 There is no certainty of the novelty of these 14 articles; they just might have been transplanted of another donor country because of this they are reference as different. An example of duplication laws can be observed in the classification of companies in the two codes.
Panamanian Commercial Code of 1869 Chilean Commercial Code of 1865
Art. 463 "The law recognizes three kinds of company: 1. Collective company; 2. Anonymous company; 3. Comandita in company."
"It also recognizes the association or accounts in participation."
Art. 269 "The law recognizes three kinds of company: 1. Collective company; 2. Anonymous company; 3. Comandita in company."
The following laws reformed the Panamanian Commercial Code with respect to its business regulation since its adoption as the Colombian Commercial Code:
1. Law 27 of 1888 -Through this law, powers
were granted for government intervention in corporations and were regulated some aspects of insurance business, among other reforms.
With respect to business entities it established that Government would exercise an inspection power among all corporations organized and located among the country 22 It also prohibited: 1) the existence of corporations with an undetermined duration; 23 or 2) those contrary to good costumes, public order and legal prescriptions; as well 3) that those that tend monopoly of subsistence's as or some branch of industry. an anonymous company to engage in operations 27 Phanor James Eder also acknowledges the possibility of discouragement in the use of this business entity because in 1952 a decree extended jurisdiction to the Superintendent of Share Companies, in his own words, […By Decree No. 2832 of November 19, 1952 (El Siglo, Bogotá, November 20, 1952 , this advantage has been in large part swept away. The new decree extends the jurisdiction of the Superintendent of Share Companies to limited liability firms and other partnerships if 33% or more of their subscribed capital is owned by a stock corporation. In such case application must be made to the Superintendent by firms heretofore organized for authority to continue doing business. They must file balance-sheets, provide proportional voting for directors, and will be subject to government inspection and to sundry other rigorous provisions and requirements embodied in the corporations laws. This decree, by its extension of government intervention, however logical it may seem, is an unfortunate step backwards which may tend to further discourage foreign capital investment." (Eder, 1853) 28 Other reforms to the commercial code were made through the of its object without a special permission provided by the Superintendent of Corporations.
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The modifications made by this decree were inspired by the Spanish draft of law of corporations that eventually became law, and this law was inspired by Italian Law. (Pinzon, 1962) 
B.3. Third Period of Business Regulation: 1971-1995
The actual commercial code was strongly influenced by foreign law and it may be considered as a legal transplant. However, the process of its creation is very peculiar, because it seems The majority of these modifications were inspired by foreign business law that in all cases have to be considered as good institutions; otherwise it would not seem reasonable to transplant them in first place. However, the openness and enlightenment of some of the drafters does not mean that other members of the legal community accepted and assimilated to the legal changes. In fact, when the drafting committee was discussing the creation of sole business entities, the principal argument against its creation was the ability to create a business entity without a group of owners. For some the idea was simply wrong from a semantic point of view: a company could not exist with only one person. Secondly, there was an implicit idea that with a group of owners within a company this implied some type of legal certainty for third parties willing to engage in transactions; otherwise, it would be suspicious and would facilitate fraud.
As stated by the Constitutional Court in the Sentence C-624 de 1998: (Watson,1991) 35 Other term used by Alan Watson is "divergence of law and society". This one denotes two things, first, that the "rule was not the best fitted to meet the needs and desires of a given society", and second, "that "Joint-Stock companies have funds so extremely large, and exercise powers so extensive and so materially affecting the rights and interest of other persons and the rights which the public or subjects of her Majesty have been accustomed to enjoy under the protection of the laws established in this kingdom, that to look upon a railway company in the light of a common partnership, and as subject to no greater vigilance than common partnerships are, would, I think be, greatly to mistake the functions which they perform, and the powers which they exercise of interference, not only with the public but with the private rights of all individuals in this realm. We are to look upon those powers as given to them, in consideration of a benefit which, notwithstanding all other sacrifices, it is to be presumed and hoped, on the whole, will be obtained by the public. But it being the interest of the public to protect the private rights of all individuals, and to defend them from all liabilities beyond those necessarily occasioned by the powers given by the several acts, those powers must be the dysfunction was kwon to the people concerned, and especially to those able to effect change." (Watson, 2000) always be carefully looked to; and I am clearly of opinion, that the powers which are given by an act of parliament, like that now in question, extend no farther than is expressly required for carrying into effect the undertaking and works which the act has expressly sanctioned." (Beavan, 1849) "How far those powers, which are necessarily or properly to be exercised for the purposes intended by the act extended, may very often be a subject of great difficulty. We cannot always ascertain what they are. Ample powers are given for the purpose of constructing and maintaining the railway, and for doing all those things required for its proper use when made; but I apprehend, that it has nowhere been stated, that a railway company, as such, has power to enter into all sorts of other transactions." (Beavan, 1849) One of the impressions from reading Coleman v. Eastern Countries Railway Company is that corporations were considered as a threat to the public interest because individual rights could be affected by the economic power of corporations; power that had its origin in the state itself.
Because of this, the public needed protection and the ultra vires theory was seen as a mechanism of protection between principals/shareholders and the individual rights of the public.
Another impression from the Coleman case is that corporations were creatures of the state because their power was granted by the state. The act limited the power and transaction capacity of corporations constituting a straitjacket for businesses. (Greenfield, 2001) In Colombian law, the ultra vires theory is supported in Articles 99 and 110 of the Colombian Commercial Code. Article 99 states, with respect to ultra vires: "the capacity of the partnership will circumscribe to the development of the firm or the activity provided in its social object." This article also establishes that acts directly related with the social object should be considered a part of it as well: "that all the acts with the finality of exercising rights and obligations legal or conventionally derived by the existence or activity of the partnership. theory. Article 98 defines a company as contract between two or more people with an obligation to make money, work or any other type of valuable asset with the purpose to divide between them the profits of the firm or the social activity. It also establishes that once the company is constituted legally it will constitute a legal entity -juridical person --different as the associates or partners. Article 110 stipulates the requirements that must be fulfilled in order to constitute a partnership. These requirements are a detailed set of obligations and rights that must govern the system of relationships of the firm and are known as essential elements of the articles of incorporation. Without these obligations and rights, the articles of incorporation would be declared void according to the circumstances.
The purpose of a partnership is one of the essential elements of the partnership contract and it constitutes the guidelines that determine the capacity of the partnership. Any violation of this purpose will constitute an ultra vires act and thus the partnership will be considered void.
In this order of ideas and with respect to the ultra vires theory, the regulation of Law 222 of 1995 did not adopt it. Article 72 establishes that the document that creates the "Sole Business
Entity" must fulfill some conditions in order for the merchant to register in the Chamber of Commerce. One of those conditions is to make "a clear and complete statement of the main activities, unless it is expressed that the company may perform any lawful act of commerce…" This was the first advanced in Colombian law in order to diminish the importance of ultra vires in partnership law, although, it was not complete because the evolution only applied to sole business entities and not to partnerships under the commercial code.
In Based on the previous propositions, three important conclusions can be drawn:
1. The first one is that legal transplants have been the most common tool use to modify business law in Colombia. My belief is that this circumstance started because there is an impediment in the legal system to produce its own rules and evolve by itself.
In the first and second period of business law the evolution was driven using foreign legal institutions as a source. In some cases without even conceiving the possibility that changes may have to reflect or be in tone with social relations and informal institutions of the base, as it was the case of the first and second period of business law. By contrast the third and fourth period of business law rethinks and contextualizes foreign law to local conditions and context. The second is characterized by being reformed through different laws in different type of aspects of business regulation, and even though, the source of these laws has not been traced in 44 Robert Means referring to this point said "[a] certain degree of isolation is a natural part of codification in the civilian tradition because of the relative autonomy of that traditions intellectual structure. But the disparity in development between Colombia and even relatively underdeveloped European countries like Spain magnified the isolation in two ways. The first concerned the number of persons for whom the code had any relevance. Even in Europe commercial law governed a relatively small part of the population, but that proportion was drastically smaller in an underdeveloped and basically noncommercial country like Colombia. The second is concerned the proportion of the new code that was relevant to anyone. The arguments for codification had been basically procedural and thus had little to do to any demand for the new rules governing this field; it was due to the structure of the Spanish code." (Means,1973) 45 In 1852 Law 14 empowered President Montt to hire persons with a pay equal to that as members as Supreme Court of Justice and appointed a commission to draft the bills for new codes, this is why Gabriel Ocampo drafted the Chilean Commercial Code. (Campbell, 2004) all the cases, there is a strong suggestion that were nourished by foreign law as was the case of the creation of the Limited Liability Firm that evidently had an origin of the German business entity -Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung -and probably also in Chile and Mexico business law as well.
The third period of business regulation is characterized by the participation of commissions of draftsmen in the elaboration of the commercial code. This is sufficient evidence to affirm that this code was definitely an outsourcing of law in third parties.
One of the most distinguished lawyers that par- 3. The third conclusion is that previous legal transplants are based on the assumption that foreign legal institutions where transplants were taken are better per se to achieve growth and eventually economic development. It would be a waste of time and resources to invent something that is already invented, why bother to create the wheel if your neighbor already has found a solution? It would be wasteful not to transplant legal institutions. On the other hand, are foreign legal institutions good for growth and economic development? And assuming they are does this mean that they will fit to social and economic conditions of the transplanted country?
III. LAW AnD ITs RELATIon WITh EConomIC gRoWTh AnD DEVELoPmEnT
Business law in Colombia has been transplanted on the assumption that foreign legal institutions where transplants were taken are better per se to achieve growth and eventually economic development. As previously stated, law is considered the most adaptable formal institution that can be used to create incentives that contribute to achieve economic growth and development in society. (Rodrik, 2003; Ulen 2010) In recent years, some scholars have given some thoughtful answers of the relation between institutions, and being more precise law, with growth and development. Well, understanding law as a formal institution. Particularly, Acemoglu and others (2002) have determined in a theoretical and empirical way that society's with an institutional framework that provide incentives and opportunities for investment will obtain economic gains and perhaps achieve economic growth and development or at least will be in the path to obtain it. Something called "institutional hypoth 46 The opportunities for political and economic entrepreneurs are still a mixed bag, but they overwhelmingly favor activities that promote redistributive conditions and that restrict opportunities rather than competitive conditions and that restrict opportunities rather than expand them. They seldom induce investment in education that increases productivity. The organizations that develop in this institutional Framework will become more efficient -but more efficient at making the society even more unproductive and the basic institutional structure even less conducive to productive activity. Such a path can persist because the transaction costs of the political and economic markets of those economies together with the subjective models of the actors do not lead them to move incrementally Howard more efficient outcomes." (North, 1990) When Europeans established colonies in America they arrived to geographic areas that in some cases were "sparsely populated", those regions could be considered as "poor regions".
By contrast, there were other regions, which were highly populated with some type of organization and with a certain degree of prosperity that could be considered as prosperous regions. The Basic idea of Acemoglu and others (2002) is that good institutions, also called as "institutions of private property", are essential for economic performance because they create a "cluster of institutions" that ensure "secure property rights for a broad section of society". On the other hand, "extractive institutions" created conditions of economic gain for small groups but as a whole there is not a win solution for society, only for the extracting group, there are characterized by concentration of power in small elites that detent political power and a constant threat of expropriation for the population outside the rulers group.
An example of an extractive institution that contributed to the "institutional reversal" in Spanish American Colonies was the Encomienda.
Encomienda was a right over indigenous labor, it permitted Encomenderos extract a tribute or payment determined by the output, or they could use the Indigenous as a labor force for their own benefit. In the end, Encomienda was a restricted type of property right over Indigenous labor granted by the Crown in specific areas. Furthermore, this right was restricted in three ways, first of all, Encomenderos did not own Indians, they were not considered a thing or object and because of this they could not be negotiated and were not in commerce. In other words they could not be bought, rented or other. Second, Encomenderos could not succeed or inherit their title, it was forbidden to them. With respect to the transmission of the rights of the title to descendents they only could be transfer to the second generation, after this generation encomienda return to the dominium of the Crown, and could go to other Encomenderos or be retained by the Crown. Third, Encomenderos had a right to the labor of the indigenous people in a determined territory they did not own any title to the land, because of this they could not be reallocated in other geographic parts. The Encomienda seemed like a reasonable institution for the Crown although it generated the type of incentives that fit a tragedy of the commons situation described by Garret Hardin guarded its security at expense of creating a poor institutional framework for productivity and investment…." The important thing stated so far, is that institutions play a key role in the economic growth and Dani Rodrik, pointed out the necessity of other type of institutions, besides market creating institutions--those that protect property rights and ensure that contracts are enforced--in order to obtain long-term economic growth and achieve development. Rodrik (2003) suggests, market regulating, market stabilizing, and market legitimizing institutions.
It is true that institutions are fundamental in societie and "good institutions" --those that generate incentives and create opportunities for investment and apply for a large portion of society --are essential for growth and economic development. Formal institutions generally adopt the form of law, and because law is the most malleable institution is likely to be transplant.
Well, this is more or less true. Yes, in some contexts law will matter, and probably business and commercial would encourage growth and economic development. Conversely, in others it might not, or it will do so partially given specific circumstances. New research has shown that under some circumstances social rules will be the key. According to Ellickson study of Shasta County, Coase was correct, but not because transaction costs were zero, but because, transaction costs were high, the legal process, the living law has its costs, well at least, residents have this conception, and because this they relay on informal norms to find a solution to the trespass problems. In words of Ellickson (1986): small boy a hammer, and he will find that everything he encounters needs pounding…][…The price of training is always a certain "trained incapacity": the more we know to do something, the harder it is to learn to do it differently (children learn to speak a foreign language with less of an accent than adults do only because they did not know their own language so well to start with)". Professor Ulen arguments are the following. First, he affirms that it's a fact that other alternatives to law might perform the same function of it, and using as an example the empirical work made by Robert C. Ellickson in Shasta County, he says, "social norms appear to be a close substitute for the law…][…formal law may not be necessary for a well-ordered society; social norms may serve perfectly well. In fact, it may be the case that where the institutions of law are either absent or ill-managed, social norms become elaborate enough to perform many of the functions that a well -functioning legal system would have provided." So he concludes, "It may be, then, that the absence of a well-functioning legal system should not be taken as a signal that a society cannot sustain modern economic growth...][…a modern legal system may be a product of development, not a prerequisite to it…" The second one stability, this is an important condition for "long-term growth". Economic agents need to perceive that propitious conditions are going to maintain constant because their expectations are supported on those believes, in his own words, "stability of back-ground conditions is extremely important to "long-run growth." Because of this, he manifests, some tensions might surge between having the correct institutions and having stable but not idea institutions that could be more propitious for economic growth. The third one is political courage; economic growth implies a change in actual economic conditions, because of this some agents will gain more economic power with respect to others, that probably, will imply that some agents that detent power wont maintain it, in Ulen words, "gainers will surely encourage and accept the change, but losers may fight to prevent their losses from be- Our view is very skeptical in believing that donor legal institutions, as the case of foreign business law, are better per se for encouraging growth and development. The belief assumes that foreign legal institutions of "modern" or "developed" countries are good institutions, and understanding by good institutions those institutions that root growth and economic development.
Well, so just, why not start borrowing rules from China? Eventually they will be developed at almost growing rates of 10% GDP in past 30 years.
China GDP has grown since 1978 at an average rate of 9.98% per year, and passed from 148. As we said before, it is true that institutions are fundamental in society and "good institutions" --those that generate incentives and create opportunities for investment and apply for a large portion of society --are vital for growth and economic development.
The problem is that the impact of formal institutions, law as it principal form, in growth and coming permanent or crippling." This struggle process between losers and winners will probably imply a block of the economic reforms that change the balance of political power. (See for a further discussion, Acemoglu Daron and James A. Robinson, Political Losers As a Barrier to Economic Development. January 11, 2000.) This is why "leaders with extraordinary courage, vision and determination" are necessary in order to conceive, implement and achieve policies that will conduce to the path of economic growth, even though, they would not be popular for some economic as well as political sectors. Conversely, in others it might not, or it will do so partially given specific circumstances. As we have seen, new research has shown that under some circumstances social rules will be the key and not law. This means that we need to study more the relation of law and development, and even much more the impact of foreign law in growth and development of countries like Colombia.
Now lets imagine that institutions of developed countries are "good institutions", would this mean that foreign "good institutions" will function the same as in the donor country? We presume they will not. We are not going to elaborate this answer, as we have seen law is the most malleable institution and because of this is likely to be transplanted or borrowed. Not acknowledging that things simply might be different and may need different solutions, solutions in some cases in harmony with local context, would be a clear mistake in borrowing foreign law. In my opinion legal institutions should be rooted in social-economic contexts were they are meant to fit.
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Acknowledging potential implementation problems of legal transplants does not mean that in the process of evolution of commercial and busi-51 Contrary to this view Jonathan M. Miller noted that in some cases, the previous process could have an Achilles' heel, in his words, "local product may be as unrealistic as any transplant. While one would expect domestic drafters to have a sense of local problems, nothing makes local drafting "per se" better suited to local conditions than a foreign model that local legislators deem useful." ness law foreign legal institutions and ideas in general should not be used as an input. Indeed legal reforms could benefit from previous and foreign ideas, the point is that those business reform projects inspired in foreign legal institutions should be rooted in social, cultural and economic relations, at least legal rules would fit those conditions; on the contrary, if the cost of rearranging those conditions with formal institutions would be excessive or prohibitive to accomplish, it would be helpful in economic terms to have a one size fit all legal institutions --rules or principles --at least with them it would be easier to connect society conditions with law.
IV. PATh DEPEnDEnCE AnD EVoLuTIon of BusInEss LAW In CoLomBIA
What happens to legal culture when law is constantly borrowed, and not provided by its own legal system? In our belief, it creates a dependent situation and an implicit perception in legal culture that in order to achieve growth and economic development it is necessary to have institutions, including law, equal or similar as developed countries, this is one of the causes that from time to time Colombia runs an actualization process of legal institutions. And generally when foreign legal systems evolve by inventing or innovating legal institutions there is a necessity to catch up these foreign systems and the perception is that law is anachronic; therefore the system runs again an actualization process of legal institutions and the path dependence continues again.
V. AsymmETRy of InfoRmATIon AnD goVERnmEnT fAILuRE In CoLomBIA
The frequently evolution of business law in
Colombia by outsourced commissions conformed by notable leading corporate lawyers, which use as principal source foreign business law of developed countries is rooted in an impediment of the legal system to produce its own rules and evolve by itself. We think, the impediment is an asymmetry of information between governmental organizations encharged of developing legal infrastructure and the necessities of economic agents and the existing extralegal institutions of society and markets. Katarina Pistor with respect to this point says that, "the external supply of best practice law, while facilitating more radical change than might be feasible without external pressure, sterilizes the process of law-making from political and socio-economic development, and thereby distances it from the process of continuous adaptation and innovation. The process of legal innovation depends on the availability of information not only about the contents of legal rules -some thing international legal standards do providebut also about their functioning in the context of 58 Jonathan M. Miller considers that bricolage "[…process of bricolage, simply pasting together whatever one has at hand, and the results may appear to have the time or lacked the technical competence to anchor " a living legal system. The perfect construction of law by legal experts for wide dissemination can deprive law makers and law enforcers in the receiving countries of the knowledge of living law, which is context specific."
Third parties encharged of law production --through an outsourcing process --could tend to barrow legal institutions only because others have borrowed them and are some type of fashion thing to have them, something like a "bandwagon effect" in legal transplants. All these circumstances and probably others not included will affect an eventual institutional legal change done by different parties entrusted with law production, as is the case of commissions conformed by notable leading corporate lawyers.
Nevertheless, if changes in legal institutions imply variation in the balance of power of domestic, and even in some cases in foreign interest groups, the process might be different, because, new legal institutions will generate a "creative destruction" process. Eventually, someone will obtain benefits and other will achieve loses, but if the party who loses has a dependent and proportional relation with political actors, there is a high possibility that the legal change will be block by those groups, unless there is superior gain obtained and provided by the beneficiaries of the change to unblock the change through political channels. At the end of the day, if a sort of political efficiency is achieve legal Institutions will be reform, and in some cases transplanted and borrowed from foreign countries in a process driven up-down the base of society and the market without having information of the way things are done in society and markets, the dogs will continue to bark and social relations will continue to be the guideline of informal markets and business.
In the process of setting rules and standards is crucial and relevant information, as well that for the enforcement and the evolution of new legal institutions and rules, as says, "[a] modern legal system continuously produces data-legislation, court decision, and scholarly writing-that the system's decision makers consider relevant." In this point "cognitive legal institutions" enter in action by transmitting "knowledge of legal rules from their makers to those who apply and obey them. This is the function of the official gazette and the pub- Legal institutions must perform this function to flesh out the framework of legal rules and adjust it to changing conditions through the accumulation of case law and doctrine."
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As it was said previously, acknowledging potential implementation problems of legal transplants does not mean that in the process of evolution of business law through foreign legal 59 Robert C. Means (1973) almost 40 years ago affirmed that In the nineteenth-century Colombian "[c]ognitive legal institutions were poorly developed at best, and those that existed--the law schools and some treatises--ignored corporate law." Nevertheless, according to him " [t] he lack of widespread dissemination of legal rules in Colombia is probably due more to social problems such as illiteracy and geographical remoteness than to inherent defects in the legal institutions." institutions and ideas in general should not be used as an input.
Indeed legal reforms could benefit from previous and foreign ideas, the point is that those business reform projects inspired in foreign legal institutions should be rooted in social, cultural and economic relations, at least legal rules would fit those conditions; on the contrary, if the cost of rearranging those conditions with formal institutions would be excessive or prohibitive to accomplish, it would be helpful in economic terms to have a one size fit all legal institutions --rules or principles --at least with them it would be easier to connect society conditions with law.
As Jurgen Habermas (2001) 
VI. ConCLusIon
Based on the previous discussions above, some important conclusions can be drawn:
One of the first conclusions that can be drawn is that legal transplants have been the most common method used to create and modify business laws in Colombia. Most likely this started because there is an impediment in the Colombian legal system, the existence of asymmetry of information between governmental organizations encharged of developing legal infrastructure and the necessities of economic agents and the existing extralegal institutions of society and markets; which hinders its ability to produce its own rules and evolve by itself.
During the first and second periods of business law the evolution of law was driven by using foreign legal institutions as a source. Many times this was done without considering the affects that these foreign laws would have on Colombian society. In contrast, the third and fourth periods of Colombian business law evolution rethinks and contextualizes foreign law to local conditions and context. However, in all periods of Colombian business law evolution of law has been driven by the top down to the base of society and not from the base to the top, specially by outsourcing legal production in commissions conformed by notable leading corporate lawyers, which have used as principal source foreign business law of developed countries, especially from those influenced by the academic and professional background of these notable lawyers. Continually outsourcing law has created a legal dependency in foreign business law as an input of Colombian business law and an implicit perception in legal culture that it's necessary to have legal institutions equal or similar as developed countries to achieve growth and economic development.
Another conclusion is that lawyers outsourcing law may be affected by the existence of asymmetry of information problems, especially when drafters don't know the social economic context where law will apply, or when they only consider their available information and tools to do the transplant, incurring in some sort of bricolage transplant.
We believe that most of the legal transplants in Colombian business law are based on the assumption that transplanting laws from foreign legal institutions are per se better than creating laws based on the needs of the citizens in order to achieve growth and spur eventually economic development.
However this is not necessarily true. Constantly transplanting laws from other countries, have caused legal dependency in foreign law. This in turn creates the perception that it is necessary for developing countries to have legal institutions equal or similar to those of developed countries in order to achieve growth and spur economic development.
The point is that legal reform projects inspired by foreign legal institutions should be rooted in social, cultural and economic needs within Colombia. As lawmakers continue to apply and create laws to situations and circumstances here in Colombia, Colombia as a country can end its legal dependency on other countries and create business laws that will truly benefit its citizens.
Governments in developing and third world countries must not take laws from developed countries solely because they are already in existence; each country must look at its society and determine if there is a need for additional laws. If there is a need or demand, then countries should not blatantly copy or borrow from other countries; if they do decide to borrow laws from other countries those laws should fit to the needs of the citizens within their country.
Another conclusion, Is that, whenever foreign legal systems evolve by inventing new legal institutions or innovating legal institutions, automatically there is a necessity to catch up these foreign legal systems; therefore the system runs again an actualization process of legal institutions and the legal path dependence continues again, probably encouraged by some type of "bandwagon effect" in legal transplants.
This article is not stating that transplanting laws and rules from other countries is necessarily a bad thing. All countries have received inspiration from other countries when drafting laws for their citizens. Also, acknowledging potential implementation problems of legal transplants does not mean that the ideas and laws of foreign legal institutions and ideas in general should not be used as an input. Indeed, legal reforms could benefit from previous and foreign ideas.
